



Do exporters really pay higher wages? 
First evidence from German linked  
employer-employee data 
University of Lüneburg 







ISSN 1860 - 5508 
by 
Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner 
  
Do exporters really pay higher wages? 




b and Joachim Wagner
c 
 
[First version: June 2004; revised March 2005 and January 2006; 
this version: June 2006] 
 
 
Abstract: Many plant-level studies find that average wages in exporting firms are 
higher than in non-exporting firms from the same industry and region. This paper 
uses a large set of linked employer-employee data from Germany to analyze this 
exporter wage premium. We show that the wage differential becomes smaller but 
does not completely vanish when observable and unobservable characteristics of 
the employees and of the work place are controlled for. For example, blue-collar 
(white-collar) employees working in a plant with an export-sales ratio of 60 percent 
earn about 1.8 (0.9) percent more than similar employees in otherwise identical 
non-exporting plants. 
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About ten years ago Bernard and Jensen (1995) published a Brookings paper on 
“Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing” that used hundreds of 
thousands of plant level data to provide facts and figures on exporting plants 
compared to their non-exporting counter-parts. One of the new and exciting 
findings documented in this paper is that exporters tend to pay higher wages and 
benefits: Average wages and benefits (per worker, per production worker, and per 
non-production worker) are higher in exporting plants than in non-exporting plants 
of all size classes. Exporter wage premia are statistically significant for all 
categories of wages and benefits after controlling for capital per worker, size of 
plant, multi-plant dummy, industry, year, plant age, and region. Coefficients of 
exporter status dummies are statistically significant in fixed effects regressions 
controlling for capital per worker, hours per worker, size of plant, and year. 
 
The Bernard and Jensen (1995) paper started a literature. A synopsis of 21 
studies covering 22 different countries from highly developed economies like the 
U.S., Germany, and Sweden, and emerging economies like Taiwan, Korea, and 
Mexico, to transition countries (Estonia, Slovenia) and least developed Sub-
Saharan African economies like Burundi or Ethiopia is provided in an Appendix 
Table. The empirical strategies used in these papers replicate (sometimes only 
partly) the approach introduced by Bernard and Jensen, and the results regarding 
the exporter wage premia are broadly consistent with the findings from the 
pioneering study. 
 
An open question not dealt with in this literature is whether these exporter wage 
premia do indeed indicate that exporting plants pay higher wages in the sense that 
comparable workers are better paid when working on a comparable work place for 
an exporter, i.e. ceteris paribus. Given that all the empirical studies listed in 
Appendix 1 use average data at the plant or firm level, individual characteristics of 
the workers that might influence their productivity (and, therefore, their wages) 
cannot be taken into account, and certain characteristics of the work place that 
might call for compensating wage differentials are not represented adequately. 
This shortcoming has been recognized from the outset: Commenting on the 
presentation of the paper by Bernard and Jensen, Robert Z. Lawrence argued that 
"the impact of exports, while positive and statistically significant, is considerably 
reduced once the effects of capital intensity, industry, plant scale, and location are 
controlled for. One suspects, moreover, that the premiums would be even further 





Thus the wage benefits that are attributable solely to exporting appear to be rather 
small." (Bernard and Jensen 1995, p. 113f.) 
 
Besides providing a synopsis of the literature on exporter wage premia this paper 
contributes to the literature by testing for the existence of these premia when 
observable and unobservable individual characteristics of the employees and the 
work place are controlled for using a rich German linked employer-employee panel 
data set. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
data set while section 3 replicates the now standard approach using plant-level 
data. Section 4 provides results for exporter wage premia based on linked 
employer-employee data using information for both individual workers and the 
plants they are working in. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The linked employer-employee data set 
 
The use of matched employer-employee data has recently become popular as it 
allows a more detailed analysis of economic relationships. In particular, various 
analyses of the labor market can benefit from the availability of employer-
employee data.
1 In this paper, we use the LIAB, which combines the employment 
statistics of the German Federal Labor Services with plant level data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. 
 
The employment statistics (cf. Bender, Haas and Klose 2000) cover all employees 
and trainees subject to social security. They exclude, among others, the self-
employed, family workers, a subgroup of civil servants (“Beamte”), students 
enrolled in higher education and those in marginal employment. The employment 
statistics cover nearly 80 percent of all employed persons in western Germany and 
about 85 percent in eastern Germany. They are collected by the social insurance 
institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced in 1973 and are 
made available to the Federal Employment Services. Notifications are prescribed 
at the beginning and at the end of a person's employment in a plant. In addition an 
annual report for each employee is compulsory at the end of a year. Misreporting 
is legally sanctioned. The employment statistics contain information on an 
employee's occupation, the occupational status, and gross earnings up to the 
contribution assessment ceiling, and on individual characteristics like sex, age, 
                                                           
1 A survey of analyses using matched employer-employee data sets can be found in Abowd and 





nationality, marital status, and qualification. Each personnel record also contains 
the establishment identifier, the industry, and the size of the plant. 
 
Starting in 1993, the IAB Establishment Panel (cf. Kölling 2000) is drawn from a 
stratified sample of the plants included in the employment statistics, where the 
strata are defined over industries and plant sizes (large plants are oversampled), 
but the sampling within each cell is random. In 1993, the sample started with 4,265 
plants, covering 0.27 percent of all plants in western Germany (2 million) and 11 
percent of total employment (29 million). In 1996, the eastern German 
establishment panel started with 4,313 establishments representing 1.10 percent 
of all plants (391,000) and 11 percent of total employment (6 million). The IAB 
Establishment Panel has been set up for the needs of the Federal Labor Services 
to provide further information about the demand side of the labor market. 
Therefore, detailed information on the composition of the workforce and its 
development through time constitutes a major part of the questionnaire. Further 
questions include information on training and further education, wages, working 
time, business activities, establishment policies, and general information about the 
plant. Other topics, for instance, questions on innovations or the flexibility of labor, 
are asked biannually or triannually. 
 
The LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics and the IAB 
Establishment Panel through a plant identifier which is available in both data sets.
2 
This matched employer-employee data set is unique for Germany. The version we 
use comprises the years 1993 to 1997. Since precise information on the collective 
bargaining regime of plants (needed for the imputation of wage data) is not 
available before 1995 and since we employ lags of investment, we can only make 
use of the waves 1995 to 1997. We exclude establishments that are located in the 
eastern part of Germany since the economic situation (and the level of wages) in 
post-communist eastern Germany still differs considerably from that in western 
Germany. Also, we focus on the manufacturing sector since exports are only of 
minor importance in the service sector. Therefore, in the regressions we end up 
with a sample of 1,855,034 observations of 918,149 employees in 1,262 
establishments. This is composed of 1,189,469 observations of 585,692 blue-
collar workers and 601,250 observations of 306,229 white-collar employees. 
 
                                                           
2 The LIAB data are confidential but not exclusive. They are available for non-commercial research 
by visiting the data access center of the German Federal Labor Services at the IAB in Nuernberg, 
Germany. Researchers interested in replications or extensions of our work may contact the first 
author (e-mail: Thorsten.Schank@wiso.uni-erlangen.de) for a copy of the Stata do-files used to 





The dependent variable in our investigation is the log of wages, taken from the IAB 
Establishment Panel and, alternatively, from the employment statistics. Whereas 
the IAB panel data just provide information on the total wage bill of an 
establishment, the information on individual earnings in the employment statistics 
is more detailed, but it refers only to the income subject to social security 
contributions (i.e. up to the contribution assessment ceiling of the social security 
system).  
 
For blue-collar workers, this problem is of minor importance since only 1.7 percent 
of the observations are reported to be at the ceiling. For white-collar workers, 
however, one third of the wage-observations are censored. As is well-known, not 
taking account of the censoring and applying OLS (or standard fixed effects 
techniques) to either all observations or to the reduced sample without the values 
on the ceiling yields biased estimates. We treat the data problem as a missing 
data problem and multiply impute the censored wages of white-collar workers by 
draws of a random variable from a truncated distribution.
3 Details of the applied 
Markov chain Monte Carlo technique can be found in Appendix 2. To obtain more 
precise imputed values, we have performed the procedure separately for each of 
the fourteen manufacturing industries in our sample. We should also point out that 
the imputation takes account of plant-fixed effects, which seems important since 




Provided that certain regularity conditions are satisfied, the stationary distribution 
of the Markov chain approaches the conditional distribution of the unobserved 
wages above the ceiling, given the observed uncensored wages (see Schafer 
1997).  Making use of only a single imputation and then applying OLS would – in 
our context – yield parameter estimates equivalent to a Tobit regression with 
unimputed data. However, in subsequent analyses we want to control for person 
or plant heterogeneity, which is less straightforward with a Tobit model. In addition, 
without special corrective measures, single-imputation inference tends to overstate 
                                                           
3 Multiple imputation has been developed by Rubin (1978) and is explained in Rubin (1996), 
Schafer (1997) and Rässler, Rubin and Schenker (2004). The theoretical motivation for multiple 
imputations is Bayesian, although the resulting multiple imputation inference is usually also valid 
from a frequentist point of view. In the context of censored wages multiple imputation has been 
proposed and applied by Gartner and Rässler (2005). 
4 Due to technical constraints, the imputation does not deal with person effects. However, we 
believe that this is of a lesser problem in our context. The results reported in Section 4 indicate that 
the unobserved individual heterogeneity correlated with exports (and wages) is more or less 





precision because it omits the between-imputation component of variability 
(Schafer, 1997). For this reason, we apply multiple imputation. 
 
All individual-level wage regressions reported in Section 4 are carried out 
separately for blue-collar and for white-collar workers.  As mentioned above, the 
censoring problem is neglectable for the former group, such that we can use the 
unimputed data. For white-collar workers, we report both, results based on 
unimputed data (including the censored values) as well as on the data-sets which 
also include imputed values. In the case of imputed data, we estimate a wage 
regression for a given specification for each of the five (imputed) data sets and 
obtain five parameter estimates. The average of these five estimates yields the 
Multiple Imputation (MI) point estimate. The standard error of the MI point estimate 
is composed of a between component (the standard deviation of the five 
estimates) and a within component (the average of the five standard errors).
5   
 
The main focus of our analysis is on the influence of exports on wages. We can 
make use of two alternative indicators of exports: First, a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not a plant has any exports, and second the proportion of 
exports within total sales. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for these variables 
in our sample. From the results using weighted data it follows that one in five 
manufacturing plants was an exporter in the years covered. This is in line with 
results from official statistics reporting a share of exporters in all manufacturing 
plants of 23 percent for 1996 (Günterberg and Wolter 2002, p. 250). It is well 
known that both the propensity to export and the share of exports in total sales 
tend to increase with firm size in Germany (see e.g. Wagner 2001). Therefore, the 
share of employees working in exporting firms is much larger – about two thirds in 
our sample (weighted data). Due to the oversampling of larger firms in the IAB 
panel (mentioned above) the unweighted figures are much higher for both the 
share of exporters in all plants (70 percent) and the share of employees in 
exporting plants (more than 90 percent). Furthermore, the positive relationship 
between firm size and the share of exports in total sales, and the oversampling of 
larger firms in the IAB panel, leads to a proportion of exports in total sales of all 
exporting firms that is 34 percent in the unweighted data compared to 19 percent 
in the weighted data. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
                                                           





On average, exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporters. According to 
the sample of establishments from the IAB panel used in our empirical 
investigation the difference between the average monthly wage per employee 
working in a firm that does or does not export is 36.6 percent. This raw exporter 
wage premium is both statistically significant and large from an economic point of 
view. Descriptive information on the other variables employed in our analysis is 
reported in Appendix 3. 
 
 
3. Traditional Approach 
 
We start our econometric investigations with a specification which is very similar to 
that adopted by Bernard and Jensen (1995) in their seminal article. This should 
constitute a reasonable basis for comparison. Using aggregate plant data from the 
IAB establishment panel, we estimate the impact of exports on the monthly wage 
bill per employee, where we make use of two alternative indicators of exports: first, 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a plant has any exports, and second 
the proportion of exports within total sales. We include as control variables the 
logarithm of the number of employees and its square, the logarithm of capital per 
worker
6, average weekly standard hours and year dummies. Finally, a dummy 
variable for the existence of paid overtime work takes account of the fact that 
additional (paid) hours are typically compensated with an overtime premium.
7 The 
parameter estimates from an OLS regression are reported in the first (export 
dummy) and fourth (export proportion) column of Table  2. Ceteris paribus 
exporting plants do not pay higher wages than non-exporters. The statistically 
significant and economically large differential between the average wage paid by 
exporters and non-exporters mentioned above, therefore, is due to differences in 
the plant observables included in the empirical model. The export share, however, 
is positively related with wages. If the proportion of exports in total sales rises by 
ten percentage points, say, the wage per employee will increase by 1.4 percent. 
We should also note that the parameters of the control variables show the 
expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
                                                           
6 The capital stock in year t is approximated by the average of a plant’s investment in the years t, t-
1 and t-2. If for the years t, t-1 and t-2 there was only investment information available for one year 
(and two missing values), the respective (plant-year) observation was dropped from the analysis. 
7 We cannot control for the actual number of overtime hours since a considerable part of the plants 





Columns two and five of Table 2 report the estimates of wage regressions which 
additionally include 13 industry and 9 federal state dummies. While the coefficient 
on the export dummy remains zero, the impact of the export proportion halves in 
size, but is still significant. Therefore, the positive relationship between the export 
share and wages is partly due to between-industry differences.
8 Next, we control 
for unobserved plant heterogeneity and include plant fixed effects in the 
regression.
9 As can be seen from columns three and six of Table  2, both the 
coefficients on the export dummy and the export share are now totally 
insignificant, from which one might conclude that (omitted) plant heterogeneity had 
been responsible for the positive impact of the export share on wages reported 
above. However, the fixed effects estimates contain much more noise. The 
standard error for the coefficient on the export share is three times as large as the 
respective figure obtained by OLS, and all the control variables are also 
insignificant. 
 
These results differ considerably from those reported by Bernard and Wagner 
(1997) in the only other study using German data and a comparable approach: 
Bernard and Wagner found that exporting or not does make a difference, while the 
share of exports in total sales does not matter. The coefficient of the exporter 
dummy variable is statistically significant whether fixed plant effects are controlled 
for or not. One reason for the different findings of Bernard and Wagner (1997) 
could be that they relied on census-type data from official statistics (where firms 
are obliged to report true data) over a longer and different time period (1978-1992) 




4. Individual Level Wage Regressions 
 
Plant-level estimations may suffer from aggregation bias since we cannot control 
for observable and unobservable individual heterogeneity which influence wages. 
Furthermore, the wage information obtained from plant surveys is per se less 
detailed and any adjustments for part-time employment and apprentices, for 
example, can only be approximative. In this section, we present individual level 
                                                           
8 Separate regressions which (are available upon request and) either include industry or federal 
state dummies show that the industry dummies are responsible for the reduction in the coefficient 
on the export share. 
9 The industry and federal state dummies are dropped again since plants do generally neither 
change industry nor location and it is impossible to distinguish between misreporting and genuine 





wage regressions based on the linked employer-employee data described in 
section 2. Throughout, the analysis will be carried out separately for blue-collar 
and white-collar workers. Besides the different degree of wage-censoring for both 
groups, there may also be varying exporter wage premia. Bernard and Wagner 
(1997) report in their study using plant level data that the positive exporter wage 
differential is almost exclusively driven by higher wages of white-collar workers. 
 
We first apply OLS to a model without establishment level variables (except the 
information on exports), but with individual characteristics which are typically 
included in the empirical literature on wages. These comprise the following 
variables, all of which are available from the employment statistics: the age of the 
employee (and its square), a gender dummy, education dummies (without A-levels 
and apprenticeship (base category), with apprenticeship but without A-levels, 
without apprenticeship but with A-levels, with apprenticeship and A-levels, 
technical college degree, university degree, unknown education), a dummy 
variable indicating that the professional status is a master craftsman or a foreman 
and a dummy variable for non-German nationality. Note that both the data for the 
individual characteristics and the information on earnings are from official 
statistics, and, therefore, can be considered to be highly reliable. 
 
As can be seen from the first column of Table  3, exporting plants do ceteris 
paribus pay higher wages of around 2 percent, but the difference is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.
10 In contrast, we find again a significant positive 
relationship between the export share and wages. Raising the proportion of 
exports in total sales by ten percentage points increases the wage by 1.3 percent 
for blue-collar workers and by 0.6 percent for white-collar workers. Based on the 
export-share variable, there are two results emerging from this first column which 
recur throughout. First, the export wage premia is (about two times) larger for blue-
collar workers than for white-collar employees. Second (and as expected), for 
white-collar employees the parameter estimate on the export share rises 
somewhat when using the wage-data including the imputed values instead of the 
original censored observations. Since the latter yields biased estimates, in what 
follows we will always refer to the coefficients from the imputed data. 
 
As in the plant-level estimations, including industry and federal state dummies 
reduces the coefficient on the export variables (column two of Table 3), but (again) 
                                                           
10 The parameter estimates of the control variables from this and the subsequent regressions are 





the impact of the export share on wages can only partly be attributed to 
differences between industries. 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Next, we control for individual level heterogeneity by including person fixed effects. 
The parameter on the export share is now identified either (i) if a plant changes its 
export share or (ii) if an employee moves to a plant with a different export share 
than its previous employer (and analogously for the parameter on the export 
dummy). Note that 827 (or 64.3 percent) of the firms included in our sample 
exported in each year and 370 (or 28.7 percent) did not export at all, while 80 firms 
(6.2 percent) changed their exporter status once and 10 firms (0.8 percent) did so 
twice. 2,271 persons (0.2 percent) changed once between employers included in 
our sample, 20 persons (0.002 percent) did so twice. While the shares of exporter 
status or employer changers in all firms or persons are rather small, the absolute 
numbers of cases are large enough to identify the parameters of the export 
variables included in our empirical models. 
 
Column three of Table 3 reports the person fixed effects regression estimates of 
the export variables. For both blue- and white-collar workers, the wage difference 
between exporting and non-exporting plants is effectively zero. Compared with 
column two, the impact of the export share on wages reduces further, but is still 
(weakly) significant. The reduction of the coefficients (both for the exporting 
dummy as well as for the export share) when controlling for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity implies that unobserved worker characteristics are positively 
correlated with export behavior. 
 
The coefficients on the export variables might still be biased because of the 
omission of observed and unobserved plant characteristics. As a next step, we 
therefore add the same variables which have been used in the plant-level 
regressions discussed in the previous section. We also include industry and 
federal state dummies. The OLS estimates which do not take account of 
unobserved heterogeneity are reported in the first column of Table 4. These are 
best compared to the second column of Table  3. It can be observed that the 
inclusion of the plant characteristics reduces the parameters on the export 
variables. As before, the effect of the export dummy is zero. While the export 
share has still a positive and significant impact on the wages of blue-collar 
workers, its estimate is now insignificant for white-collar employees. As above, we 





Compared to conditioning on individual as well as on plant observables, the export 
share coefficient for wages of blue-collar workers falls from 4.0 to 2.7 percent, 
while the export dummy remains insignificant for this group. Both export-variables 
are now significant for white-collar workers, which was not the case without 
controlling for unobserved personnel heterogeneity. The coefficient on the export 
share implies that a rise in the proportion of exports in total sales by ten 
percentage points increases the wage for white-collar workers by 0.15 percent. 
 
In the next step, we control for unobserved plant characteristics, but not for 
unobserved personnel heterogeneity. The estimates of these plant fixed effects 
regressions, which are identified through variations of the variables within a plant, 
are reported in column three of Table 4. Interestingly, the coefficients on the export 




However, the coefficients for both person and plant fixed effects might still be 
biased – in this particular application by the same amount – because in each case 
we have controlled only for one side of the labor market. To investigate this, the 
two types of heterogeneity have to be taken account of at the same time in the 
regression. Unfortunately,  because of movement between plants, there is no 
transformation which sweeps out both sets of fixed effects simultaneously. This 
means that person de-meaned (or differenced) firm dummies need to be created 
and estimated.
11 If one is not interested in the estimates of the heterogeneity 
themselves, consistent estimates of the coefficients on the observables can be 
obtained in a computationally far more straightforward way (see Andrews, Schank 
and Upward 2006). One simply defines unique worker-firm combinations (or 
‘spells’). By definition, neither the worker nor the firm unobserved (time-invariant) 
characteristics vary for a given spell. Therefore, we can sweep out both by 
applying spell fixed effects. Effectively, this uses only the differences between two 
consecutive observations if the worker does not change his employer between two 
periods.
12 
                                                           
11 Alternatively, one could also create and estimate firm de-meaned person dummies, but the 
dimension of persons is usually much larger than the dimension of firms. 
12 Note that this applies to nearly all persons in our regression sample because only 2,271 persons 
changed between employers included here once, and 20 did so twice. Since the proportion of 
plant-movers is tiny, any selection bias due to ignoring wage-changes of individuals moving 
between plants should be negligible. Moreover, it is often argued that mobility is not exogenous, 
which means that an individual’s productivity may differ between firms because the quality of the 
match between an individual and a firm varies. To the extent that the (unobserved) quality of the 
match and a firm characteristic are correlated, the estimated firm coefficients will be biased (see 






Spell fixed effects thus are our preferred specification, the results of which are 
reported in the last column of Table 4. It appears that the parameter estimates on 
the export variables are more or less identical to person or plant fixed effects. 
Therefore, we can safely conclude that exporting per se does hardly matter, but 
that the export share has a statistically significant impact on wages. An increase in 
the proportion of exports by 10 percentage points increases the wage of a blue-
collar (white-collar) worker by 0.30 (0.15) percent. This means that a blue-collar 
employee working in a plant that exports 40 / 60 / 80 percent of its production 
earns about 1.2 / 1.8 / 2.4 percent more than an employee in a non-exporting 
plant, ceteris paribus, i.e. after controlling for observable and unobservable 
individual and plant characteristics. For white-collar workers, the exporter wage 
premium is lower and amounts to exactly half of the respective values. As the 
synopsis in Appendix  1 demonstrates, similar results have been obtained in 
studies for other countries (see, e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999, 2004, and 






The bottom line of our empirical study on the relationship between exporting and 
wages in West German manufacturing plants is an affirmative answer to the 
question in the title – exporters really do pay higher wages. Using linked employer-
employee data to control for observable and unobservable individual and plant 
characteristics in the most comprehensive way possible we observe that wages 
increase with the share of production firms sell on foreign markets. This ceteris 
paribus exporter wage premium is neither (unplausibly) large nor negligible – 
working in a plant with, e.g., an export/sales ratio of 60 percent means for a blue-
collar (white-collar) employee earning about 1.8 (0.9) percent more compared to 
working in an otherwise identical plant that does not export at all. 
 
The positive relationship between wages and the share of exports in total sales is 
in line with previous findings reported in the literature. Three of the studies for 
other countries using aggregate firm level data (listed in the synopsis in 
Appendix 1) look at the role of export shares. Both Liu, Tsou and Hammitt (1999) 
for Taiwan and Isgut (2001) for Columbia report a positive impact of the export 
share on wages after controlling for unobservable plant heterogeneity, as do 





these studies, however, uses linked employer-employee data, so the results may 




An open question to be considered next is why according to our preferred 
specification with spell fixed effects (reported in the last column of Table 4) wages 
tend to increase with the proportion of exports in total sales, ceteris paribus. By 
construction neither observed nor (time-invariant) unobserved characteristics of 
the workers or the workplace can matter here. Given that the exporter wage 
premia are paid voluntarily and that the higher wages paid by more export-
intensive plants lead to higher costs, the answer must lie in a positive relationship 
between wage premia over and above the going wage paid in other firms on the 
one hand, and success on exports markets that leads to a higher surplus on the 
other hand. 
 
This said, efficiency wage theories form a natural pool of candidates to answer the 
question under consideration here. Among the various variants of models (Yellen 
1984) the “higher-wages-reduce-turnover” variant seems to be most relevant in the 
context of German firms and exporting. To see why, remember that Germany is a 
high-wage country. Labor costs per unit of output are higher in Germany than in 
other competing highly industrialized countries including the U.S., UK, and Japan 
(Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln 2004, p.7). High unit labor costs and a 
strong currency mean that German exporters cannot base their success in 
international market on low-priced products. Instead, they have to rely on complex 
high-quality products. To successfully produce this kind of products the tacit 
knowledge of the experienced workforce is a limiting factor of production. 
Managers often point to the non-transferable know-how incorporated in the firm’s 
workforce when asked why they still produce in high-cost Germany instead of, say, 
China or India.
14 Labor turnover is rather costly in these cases, so firms will be 
interested to reduce quits. One way to achieve this is to pay a premium above the 
going wage that a worker could earn in another plant. The higher the export/sales 
                                                           
13 To the best of our knowledge there is only one contemporaneous study on exports and wages 
based on linked employer-employee data: Milner and Tandrayen (2004) use data for 1993 to 1995 
from six African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). They find 
a positive and significant wage premium for workers in exporting firms, even after controlling for 
firm and individual characteristics. The positive effect is larger for skilled workers, but positive only 
for firms that sell inside Africa. The relation between the share of exports in total sales and wages 
is not investigated in this study, however. Two papers by Gustavsson, Heyman and Sjöholm (2004) 
and by Martins (2004) use linked employer-employee data to look at the related issue of wage 
differentials between local and foreign owned firms in Sweden and Portugal, respectively. 
14 For a recent example, see Bernhard Schreier of Heidelberger Druckmaschinen, the world market 





ratio and the share of profits earned on the world market, the more important will 
an experienced workforce be to secure high quality of products and 




An alternative interpretation of our finding that wages tend to increase with the 
proportion of exports in total sales would be that firms with high export shares 
might have experienced relatively favorable foreign demand shocks, and have 
raised wages to attract a relatively large work force in response. Such an 
explanation for cross-firm wage heterogeneity when workers are homogeneous 
can be found in some search-theoretic models which assume that individuals work 
at different wages, so that the labor supply curve is upward-sloping from the point 
of view of an employer (see, e.g., Bontemps et al. 2000). While in equilibrium all 
firms have the same level of profits, this can be attained by paying a low wage 
(thus attracting few workers) as well as by paying a high wage (thus attracting 
many workers). Furthermore, if firms employ different production technologies so 
that workers are more productive in one firm than in another, more productive 
firms may offer higher wages. Since there is some theoretical support (see 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) and empirical evidence (for Germany, see 
Wagner 2006) for exporting firms being more productive, this could also explain 
the exporter wage premium. Unfortunately, with our data we are not able to 
adequately test and empirically discriminate between the alternative explanations 
sketched above. 
 
A question not discussed here is the direction of causality: Do exporters pay 
higher wages because they are exporters? Did they pay higher wages before they 
started to export? Do wages increase faster in firms that started to export than in 
comparable non-exporting firms? To investigate this important topic in a 
convincing way linked employer-employee data are needed for a panel that covers 
at least seven years, and that includes a large number of export starters which can 
be monitored (at least three years) before and (at least three years) after 
beginning to export, and which can be compared to (matched) firms that did not 
start to export (see Wagner 2002 for such a study using plant level panel data). 
The LIAB data used in our study are not (yet) suited for this kind of study, so the 
topic of causality is left for future research. 
                                                           
15 Unfortunately with the data used here it is not possible to test for a difference in labor turnover 





Table 1:   Incidence and Coverage of Exporting Plants. 
     Manufacturing, Western Germany (Percentages) 
 Weighted  Unweighted
1 
Share of exporting plants  19.1  70.6 
Employment share of exporting plants   64.8  92.7 
Proportion of exports within total sales of 
exporting plants 
18.9 33.8 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995-1997. 





Table 2:   Plant Level Wage Regressions. Manufacturing, Western Germany 
    (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Monthly Wage Bill per Employee) 
Estimation Method  OLS OLS Plant 
Fixed 
Effects 
OLS OLS Plant 
Fixed 
Effects 
Variables        






   
Exports (proportion of total 
sales) 






Logarithm of establishment 























































Paid overtime work in 













13 industry dummies  no  yes***  no  no  yes***  no 
9 federal state dummies 
 













        
R
2  0.337 0.414 0.025 0.343 0.415 0.025 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995-1997. 2,797 observations from 1,287 plants. Regressions 
include year dummies. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are allowed 





 Table 3:   Estimates of Exporter Wage Premium 
                 Individual Level Regressions of Manufacturing, Western Germany 
                          (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage; Separate Regression for each Cell) 
  Estimation Method OLS   OLS   Person 
Fixed 
Effects 
Group of Employees  Export Variable       
Blue-Collar,  
unimputed data 






























        
White-Collar, 
imputed data  














Source: LIAB 1995-1997. 1,189,469 observations of 585,692 blue-collar workers; 601,250 
observations of 306,229 white-collar workers. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals 
within plants are allowed to be not independent. ***/ **/ * denote significance at the 1 / 5 / 10 percent 
level, respectively. Regressions include as further independent variables: age of employee, age 
squared of employee, gender, 6 education dummies, a dummy variable for the professional status 
being a master craftsman or a foreman (blue-collar workers only), a dummy variable for Non-German 
nationality, 2 year dummies and (only in the second OLS and Person Fixed Effects estimations) 13 






Table 4:   Estimates of Exporter Wage Premium 
                Individual Level Wage Regressions including Plant Characteristics. 
                 Manufacturing, Western Germany 
     (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage; Separate Regression for each Cell) 
  Estimation Method OLS   Fixed Effects (FE) 
     Person 
FE 
Plant FE  Spell FE 
Group of Employees  Export Variable         
Blue-Collar, 
unimputed data 










































        
White-Collar, 
imputed data 




















Source: LIAB 1995-1997. 1,189,469 observations of 585,692 blue-collar workers working belonging to 
1,262 plants (586,816 spells); 601,250 observations of 306,229 white-collar workers belonging to 
1,204 plants (307,314 spells). Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are 
allowed to be not independent. ***/ **/ * denote significance at the 1 / 5 / 10 percent level, respectively. 
In addition to the regressions reported in Table 3, the following plant-level variables are included: 
logarithm of the number of employees, squared logarithm of the number of employees, logarithm of 
capital per worker, weekly standard hours, a dummy variable indicating that the plant works overtime. 
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Appendix 1: Synopsis of studies on exporter wage differentials 
Author(s) 
(year of publication) 
Country 
(period covered) 




(1986 – 1989) 
Sample of 138 export firms 
and 436 non-export firms from 
five industries (food, wine, 
wood products, chemicals, 
basic metal) 
Median value of average annual wage  The null hypothesis of equal means for wage levels among export and 
non- export firms (for small and large firms separately) is rejected at the 1 
per cent level of significance. Workers of export firms have consistently 
higher wages than those from non-export firms in all industries. (Note that 
a firm was considered an exporter if at least 30 per cent of its production 
was destined for foreign markets; non-exporters sell only on the domestic 
market. Firms with less than 100 workers were classified as small firms.) 
Alvarez and López 
(2004) 
Chile 
(1990 – 1996) 
7,132 manufacturing plants 
(unbalanced panel) 
Average wage, average wage for production 
workers and for non-production workers 
Controlling for plant size, foreign ownership, 3-digit sector, and year, 
exporter premia are 21 percent for average wages, 15 percent for 




(1981 – 1991) 
5,956 to 6,909 
manufacturing plants 
(unbalanced panel) 
Average annual wages for all workers, blue collar 
workers, white collar workers, technicians, and 
managers 
Average annual wages are much higher in exporting plants than in non-
exporting plants by all five measures of wages in all plants and in plants 
from three different size classes (less than 30, 30 to 100, more than 100 
workers). Exporter wage premia are statistically significant for all wage 
measures after controlling for plant size, industry, region, year, 
export/sales ratio, and capital per worker. Fixed effects regressions 
including the exports/sales ratio, plant size, capital per worker, and year 
estimate exporter wage premia between 1.5 percent (for white collar 




(1994 – 1999) 
2,335 observations on 
manufacturing firms 
(unbalanced panel) with 420 
firms in 1994 and 303 firms in 
1999. 
Average labor costs  Average labor costs for exporters equal about four times (1994) and three 
times (1999) the average labor costs for non-exporters. 
Bernard and Wagner 
(1997) 
Germany 
[Federal State of 
Lower Saxony] 
(1978 – 1992) 
4,263 manufacturing plants in 
1978;  
4,270 manufacturing plants in 
1992 
Average annual wage;  
average annual production wage;  
average annual non-production wage 
Average annual wage, production wage and non-production wage is 
higher in all plants and in plants with less than 250 employees in 1978 
and 1992, but not for plants with more than 250 or more than 500 
employees. Wage differences are much more pronounced for white-collar 
workers. Exporter wage premia are in part statistically significant after 
controlling for plant size, capital per worker, production hours per worker, 
a multi-plant dummy, and industry: the average wage premium in 
exporting plants is 2.6 percent, while blue-collar workers receive no 
premium and white-collar workers are paid 3.3 percent more. Results 
including export intensity are similar. In a fixed effects specification both 
the premia for average wages and for white-collar wages remain 
significant. 
Arnold and Hussinger 
(2004) 
Germany 
(1992 – 2000) 
Unbalanced panel of 2,149 
observations on the firm level 
taken from the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel covering the 
manufacturing sector 
Wage per employee (exact definition not given)  The wage per employee for the 1,260 exporters is 24.7 percent higher 
than the wage paid by the 889 non-exporters. Note that firms are 
considered to be exporters only if they sell at least five percent of their 
turnover abroad.  





(1990 – 1998) 
ca. 69,000 to 97,000 
manufacturing plants 
(unbalanced panel) 
Average wage;  
average production worker wage;  
average non-production worker  wage 
Average wages are higher in exporting plants than in non-exporting plants 
by all three measures of wages in 1990, 1994 and 1998. Exporter  wage 
premia are statistically significant and high controlling for industry, region 
and plant size (in 1998, 12.5 percent, 10.5 percent, and 12.0 percent for 




(1986 – 1990) 
2,370 manufacturing plants 
(balanced panel) 
Average annual wage and benefits;  
average annual production wage;  
average annual non-production wage; average 
hourly production wage;  
average hourly non-production wage; average 
annual benefits 
Exporting plants pay higher average amounts than non-exporting plants 
for all measures of wages and benefits in 1986 and 1992. Exporter premia 
are statistically significant after controlling for capital per worker, hours per 
worker, size of plant, foreign ownership, white collar/total employment, 
industry, state and year. In a fixed-effects model only the premia for 
benefits per employee is statistically significant. However, the number of 
plants changing from non-exporter to exporter or vice versa is rather small 




(1986 – 1990) 
2,353 manufacturing plants  Average white-collar wages;  
average blue-collar wages;  
average earnings including non-wage benefits and 
social security contributions but excluding profit 
sharing;  
average earnings including everything 
Average wages are much higher in exporting plants than in non-exporting 
plants by all four measures of wages. Exporter wage premia are 
statistically significant and high controlling for industry and state; and 
controlling for size of firm, capital-labor ratio, white-collar worker share in 
total employment, foreign equity participation dummy, imported machinery 
share, royalty payment share, total factor productivity growth, tariff rates 
on outputs and inputs, and license requirements on outputs and inputs. 
Exporter wage premia are statistically significant and high (between 7 and 




(1984 – 2001) 
(1993 – 2001) 
3,003 manufacturing plants 
for 1993 – 2001 in a balanced 
panel;  
3,605 manufacturing plants 
for 1993 – 2001 in an 
unbalanced panel;  
706 plants for 1984 – 2001 in 
a balanced panel 
Average white-collar hourly wage;  
average blue-collar hourly wage;  
ratio of white-collar / blue-collar wage 
Average white-collar and blue-collar wages, and ratio of white-collar to 
blue- collar wage higher for exporters than for non-exporters in 1993, 
1997, and 2001 (balanced panel 1993 - 2001); no results reported for the 




(1994 – 2000) 
7,915 manufacturing 
establishments (unbalanced 
panel); 20,580 observations 
Average wage  Controlling for the number of employees, exporters pay 16.14 percent 





(1990 – 1999) 
10,145 observations on 1,403 
manufacturing plants 
(unbalanced panel) 
Average wage per hour  Average wages are higher in exporting firms than in non-exporting firms 
for all firms, small firms, and large firms in 1990 and 1999; note that 
differences are small in large firms (0.3 Euro and 0.5 Euro, respectively). 
Exporter wage premium is statistically significant and positive (6 percent) 
controlling for firm size, industry, year, foreign ownership, and firm age. 
Hansson and Lundin 
(2004) 
Sweden 
(1990 – 1999) 
3,275 manufacturing firms 
(between 1,565 and 1,820 
each year) in an unbalanced 
panel. 
Average annual labor costs (including social 
security) per employee;  
average earning per employee;  
average earnings of skilled employees; average 
earnings of less-skilled employees 
Average wages are significantly higher for all four wage measures in 
exporting firms than in non-exporting firms in 1990; in 1999, this holds 
only for skilled employees (while exporting firms had on average lower 
labor costs per employee). Using pooled data for 1990 to 1999 (15, 262 or 
15,413 observations) exporter wage premia are computed controlling for 
export share, firm size, capital intensity, industry and year dummies; 
results are positive and statistically significant for average labor costs  
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(wage premium: 1 percent), average earnings per employee (1.5 percent), 
and average earnings of skilled workers (7 percent), but not for average 
earnings of less- skilled workers. 




80,584 firms in ten 
manufacturing industries from 
the 1986 census 
Average annual wage of non-production labor and 
of production labor 
For all ten industries exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters to 
both their non-production and production labor. The average cross-
industry export wage premium (after controlling for firm size, foreign 
capital, firm age, multiplant status, and technology investment) is almost 
30 percent for non-production workers and 14 percent for production 
workers. 
Liu, Tsou and Hammitt 
(1999) 
Taiwan 
(1989 – 1993) 
875 plants from electronics 
industry (balanced panel) 
Information on exports only 
available for 1990 and 1992 
Average annual wage  Average annual wage is much higher in exporting plants than in non- 
exporting plants in 1992. Exporter  wage premium is statistically 
significant and positive (15.5 percent) in a random effects regression 
controlling for capital intensity, ratio of subcontracting revenues to total 
sales, and ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. 
Tsou, Liu and Hammitt 
(2002) 
Taiwan 
(1986 – 1996) 
Plant level data from the 
electrical machinery and 
electronics industry; 5,923 
plants in 1986, 8,346 plants 
Average annual wage  Average annual wages were significantly higher for exporters than for 
non-exporters; the differentials were 23.8 percent in 1991 and 18.6 
percent in 1996. 
Greenaway and Yu 
(2004) 
UK 
(1989 – 1999) 
461 firms (unbalanced panel) 
from the chemical industry; 
2,883 observations. Some 
results for “other 
manufactures” are reported, 
too. 
Average annual wage  Average annual wages are 1.5 percent higher for exporters from other 
manufacturing, and 7.6 percent higher for exporters from the chemical 
industry. Exporter premia (controlling for industry and time effects) are 4.5 
percent and 6.4 percent, respectively. 
Bernard and Jensen 
(1995) 
U.S. 
(1976 – 1987) 
193,463 manufacturing plants 
(1987 Census of 
Manufactures) ca. 400,000 
manufacturing plants (pooled 
data for 1976 – 1987) 
Average annual wage per worker;  
average annual wage per production worker; 
average annual wage per non-production worker; 
average annual benefits per worker 
All average wages and benefits are higher in exporting plants than in non- 
exporting plants of all size classes, and with less than 250 employees or 
with 250 and more employees in 1987. Exporter wage premia are 
statistically significant for all categories of wages and benefits after 
controlling for capital per worker, hours per worker, size of plant, multi-
plant dummy, industry, year, plant age, and region, amounting to 4.4 
percent for wage per worker and 7.6 percent for benefits. Coefficients of 
exporter status dummies are statistically significant in fixed effects 
regressions controlling for capital per worker, hours per worker, size of 
plant, and year. 
Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) 
U.S. 
(1984 – 1992) 
56,257 manufacturing plants 
in 1984;  
199,258 manufacturing plants 
in 1987;  
224,009 manufacturing plants 
in 1992 
Annual average wage;  
annual average production wage;  
annual average non-production wage 
Exporter wage premia are statistically significant after controlling for 
industry, state, and plant size. Estimates for 1992 are 9.3 percent for 
average wage, 6.6 percent for production wage, and 4.6 for non-
production wage. 
Bernard and Jensen 
(2004) 
U.S. 
(1984 – 1992) 
13,550 manufacturing plants 
(balanced panel) 
Average annual wage;  
annual blue-collar wage;  
annual white-collar wage 
Exporter wage premia are statistically significant after controlling for 
industry and state in 1984 and 1992; estimates for 1992 are 6.9 percent 
for average wage and blue-collar wage, and 3.7 percent for white-collar 
wage.  










(1992 / 1996) 
approx. 200 firms and three 
consecutive years in each 
country except Cote d’Ivoir 
(two years) and Burundi and 
Ethiopia (one year); 
unbalanced panels. 
Average wage;  
production wage;  
non-production wage 
Exporter wage premia is statistically significant and high (about 40 
percent) for average wage after controlling for country, year, industry, 
location, and plant size. The premia is statistically significant and high 
(about 33 percent) for non-production wage in a sub-sample with 
information on it, but not statistically significant for production wage. 
Note:  The studies are listed in alphabetical order of the country considered; studies covering up to three countries are listed separately for each country, other multi-country 





Appendix 2: The Imputation Procedure 
In multiple imputation (MI), each value of the unknown missing data  mis Y  is replaced 
by  m simulated values  ,
1
mis Y  
m
mis mis Y Y , ,
2 K .  The  m (as opposed to one) sets of 
imputations reflect uncertainty about the true values of the data. After the multiple 
imputations have been carried out, m completed data-sets (and plausible versions of 
the real data) exist, each of which can then be analyzed by standard complete-data 
methods. 
 
We assume that the (logarithm of the) wage is given by 
 
, ' * ε β + = x w  
 
where  ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ ε N .  Observed wages are uncensored and equal to actual wages 
) (
* w w w
unc obs = =  if the latter are on or below the ceiling. Otherwise observed 
wages are censored at the ceiling  ) ( c w w
cen obs = = .  We will multiply impute the 
censored wages by estimates of the unobserved wages above the ceiling, which 
follow a normal distribution truncated at c. The multiple imputation is based on a 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique, where the m simulated values are 
obtained through iterations of two steps:
16 
 
(1) In the first step, values for the missing information (i.e. for those observations 
where the wages are censored) are drawn from a truncated normal distribution:
17 
 
) , ' ( ~
) ( 2 ) ( t t c imp x N w σ β , 
 
where the c indicates that the distribution is truncated at the ceiling c from above. 
Based on the uncensored and the imputed wage data  ), , (
imp unc w w  we then estimate 
a wage equation by OLS, where we include as x-variables the same covariates as in 
the individual-level wage regressions reported in Section 4. These comprise both 
individual and plant level information (see footnotes to Tables 3 and 4 for a complete 
list of variables in addition to the export share and the export dummy) and also 
include plant dummies, but no person effects.
18  
                                                           
16 Multiple imputations based on Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques are discussed in Schafer 
(1997). We apply an algorithm of this technique proposed by Gartner and Rässler (2005) in the 
context of censored data. For a formal presentation, the reader is referred to Gartner and Rässler 
(2005). 
17 The starting values (β
(0),σ
2(0)) for the truncated distribution are obtained from a tobit estimation. 
18 For ease of exposition, we have combined individual and plant level observables as well as plant 
dummies into the vector x. This could be done without harm, since plant dummies are not treated 





(2) In the second step, the data posterior distributions can be specified, based on the 





) 1 ( 2 =
+ σ , 
 
where RSS is the residual sum of squares from the OLS regression and g is drawn 




1 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) ' ( , ˆ ~
− + + X X N
t t σ β β , 
 
where  β ˆ  is the estimated coefficient vector from the OLS regression.
19 With the new 
parameters ) , (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( + + t t σ β , we can start again with step (1). 
 
In general, we will not be able to use successive iterates of the imputed data 
because the parameters tend to be correlated (Schafer 1997). Therefore, we repeat 
steps (1) and (2) five thousand times and keep the data draws (step 1) of every one-
thousandth iteration as a new-data set.
20 Hence, we end up with five complete data 
sets, each consisting of the same unimputed data below the ceiling (w
obs=w
unc) and 
different draws of imputed data if observed wages were censored (w
imp). 
                                                           
19 Such random draws of (β
(t),σ
2(t)) are considered to be the Bayesian stochastic counterpart of 
maximizing the complete-data likelihood. 
20 For our data, autocorrelation functions of the parameters estimated from 5,000 iterations show that 





Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics; Regression Sample (Individual Level), Manufacturing, 
Western Germany 
 Blue-Collar  Workers  White-Collar  Workers 
Variables Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Logarithm of daily wage 
(in Pfennigen),    
    Reported  9.692 0.223 9.993 0.235 
    imputed wages   10.056 0.300 
Exporting plant (1 = yes)  0.931 0.254 0.915 0.278 
Exports (proportion of total sales)  0.391 0.230 0.403 0.248 
Age of employee (years) 39.296 10.374 41.574 10.121 
Age of employee squared (divided 
by 100)  16.518 8.418 18.308 8.573 
Gender (1 = female)  0.141 0.348 0.240 0.427 
Educational dummies      
   without apprenticeship, without 
   A-levels (reference group)  0.306 0.461 0.041 0.197 
   with apprenticeship,  
   without A- levels  0.652 0.476 0.586 0.493 
   without apprenticeship,  
   with A-levels  0.003 0.052 0.012 0.109 
   with apprenticeship,  
   with A-levels  0.004 0.065 0.064 0.244 
   Technical college degree  0.001 0.033 0.164 0.371 
   University degree  0.000 0.020 0.127 0.333 
   Unknown Education  0.034 0.181 0.006 0.078 
   
Master craftsman, foreman (1= yes)  0.036 0.186 0.000 0.000 
Foreign employee (1 = yes)  0.183 0.387 0.032 0.177 
Logarithm of establishment size  7.489 1.294 7.499 1.262 
Logarithm of establishment size 
squared   57.757 19.268 57.828 18.921 
Logarithm of capital per worker  9.495 0.824 9.480 0.900 
Weekly standard hours 36.005 1.479 36.151 1.397 
Paid overtime in establishment 
(1 = yes)  0.905 0.293 0.914 0.280 
Year dummies (reference: year = 
1995)      
     1996  0.301 0.459 0.316 0.465 
     1997  0.327 0.469 0.328 0.469 
Number of observations:   
   total 













Appendix 4: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
                      (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  OLS  
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        





























Age of employee squared 

























Educational dummies                
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        






    

























2  0.349 0.366 0.482 0.484 0.5  0.51 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies, but no sectoral or regional 
dummies. Reference category of education dummies is without apprenticeship, without A-levels. 
Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are allowed to be not independent. 





Appendix 5: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
         (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  OLS  
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        





























Age of employee squared 

























Educational  dummies        
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        






    












Constant          
R
2  0.479 0.484 0.517 0.517 0.54  0.54 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies as well as – in contrast to Appendix 
4 –  sectoral and regional dummies. Reference category of education dummies is without 
apprenticeship, without A-levels. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are 
















Appendix 6: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
                      (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  Person Fixed Effects 
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        











[2.63]***   
0.011 
[2.50]**   
0.013 
[1.86]* 














Age of employee squared 













Gender (1 = female)             
Educational dummies               
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        





[1.36]      
Foreign employee (1 = yes)             













2  0.968 0.968 0.984 0.984 0.95  0.95 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source: LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies as well as  sectoral and regional 
dummies. Reference category of education dummies is without apprenticeship, without A-levels. 
Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are allowed to be not independent. 





Appendix 7: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
           (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  OLS  
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        





























Age of employee squared 

























Educational dummies               
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        






    












Logarithm of establishment 























































Paid overtime work in  


























2  0.501 0.502 0.528 0.528 0.55  0.55 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source: LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies as well as  sectoral and regional 
dummies. Reference category of education dummies is without apprenticeship, without A-levels. 
Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are allowed to be not independent. 





Appendix 8: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
           (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  Person Fixed Efffects 
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        





























Age of employee squared 













Gender (1 = female) 
 
      
Educational dummies                
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        






    
Foreign employee (1 = yes) 
 
      
Logarithm of establishment 























































Paid overtime work in  


























2  0.968 0.969 0.984 0.984 0.95  0.95 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source: LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies as well as sectoral and regional 
dummies. Reference category of education dummies is without apprenticeship, without A-levels. 
Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. Residuals within plants are allowed to be not independent. 





Appendix 9: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
           (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  Plant Fixed Effects 
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        































Age of employee squared 

























Educational dummies                
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        






    












Logarithm of establishment 























































Paid overtime work in  


























2  0.348  0.348  0.49 0.51 0.49 0.51 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source: LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies. Reference category of education 
dummies is without apprenticeship, without A-levels. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. 
Residuals within plants are allowed to be not independent. ***/ **/ * denote significance at the 1 / 5 / 10 





Appendix 10: Individual Level Wage Regressions; Manufacturing, Western Germany 
             (Endogenous Variable: Logarithm of Daily Wage) 
Estimation Method  Spell Fixed Effects  
  Blue-Collar Workers   White-Collar Workers   
  Unimputed Data  Unimputed Data  Imputed Data 
Variables        





























Age of employee squared 













Gender (1 = female)             
Educational dummies                
   with apprenticeship,  













   without apprenticeship,  













   with apprenticeship,  

















































        






    
Foreign employee (1 = yes)             
Logarithm of establishment 























































Paid overtime work in  


























2  0.969  0.969 0.984 0.984 0.95  0.95 
No. of observations  1,189,469  601,250 
No. of employees  585,692  306,229 
No. of plants  1,262  1,204 
No. of spells  586,816  307,314 
Source:  LIAB 1995-1997. Regressions include also year dummies. Reference category of education 
dummies is without apprenticeship, without A-levels. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. 
Residuals within plants are allowed to be not independent. ***/ **/ * denote significance at the 1 / 5 / 10 
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